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Abstract Is a philosophical theory needed to ‘underwrite’ attitudes of toleration and
respect in a multicultural and religiously diverse world? Many philosophers of religion
have thought so, including Victoria Harrison. This article interrogates Harrison’s theory
of internalist pluralism, which, though offering a welcome alternative to other theories,
such as John Hick’s ‘pluralistic hypothesis’, nevertheless faces problems. Questioning
the coherence of the theory’s account of how the existence of objects of worship can
avoid being fully conceptual-scheme dependent, and raising doubts about its preten-
sions to promote interreligious harmony, I also critically discuss the common philo-
sophical tendency to work with under-described and insufficiently analysed examples.
What philosophy ought to be able to offer in relation to religious diversity, I propose, is
attentiveness to nuances and particularities, thereby aiding religious understanding
without the need for a general theory.
Keywords Religious diversity . Internalist pluralism . Conceptual schemes . Victoria
Harrison . Interreligious disagreement
Many philosophers believe that philosophy’s business is to devise theories in order to
explain aspects of the world in which we live. So, when confronted with the phenom-
enon of religious diversity, philosophers of religion often treat it as a problem to be
solved, and hence go looking for a theory to solve it. In the rush to find a theory, the
task of articulating what the problem is supposed to be is frequently underexplored. For
example, Victoria Harrison writes as follows:
As societies become increasingly multicultural, there progressively arises a need
for an appropriate theory that is capable of making sense of the various difficul-
ties presented by religious diversity. To be precise, what seems to be required at
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this historical juncture is a theory of religious pluralism that is suitably sensitive
to the challenge posed by cultural diversity, while remaining respectful of
religious differences. (2006, p. 287)1
Here we are told that religious diversity presents us with ‘various difficulties’ and that
these difficulties generate the need for a theory that can make sense of them. But what
are those difficulties, and why should a philosophical theory be needed?
From a careful reading of Harrison’s work, it appears that the main difficulty she has
in mind is the phenomenon of interreligious disagreement. The fact that, on the face of
it, adherents of different religions appear to disagree on many matters—including not
only religious doctrines but also more immediately practical issues of how to live—
raises the question of how to get along with one another without the disagreements
degenerating into conflict and violence. In short, Harrison is eager to promote ‘religious
toleration’ (2008, p. 109) and ‘equal respect [for] all ethical and religious belief
systems’ (2012, p. 84). So her task is to construct a theory that will ‘underwrite the
appropriateness’ of interreligious toleration and respect (2008, p. 109)—and to do so by
showing how it can be the case that apparently contradictory beliefs might all be true.
Personally speaking, I am in favour of promoting mutual respect between people in
general, including those whose religious or nonreligious affiliations diverge from one
another’s. If philosophy has any role to play in that project, it is, or should be, the role
of exemplifying how a deepened understanding of diverse religious and nonreligious
forms of life (or perspectives, worldviews, belief systems) may be arrived at. That
deepening of understanding is unlikely to always lead to enhanced tolerance and
respect. There is no reason in principle why it should not sometimes lead to an
accentuation of hostility; for in some instances, the more one learns about a given
form of life, the more one may come to deplore it. A view of philosophy that prioritises
understanding and elucidation will thus not inevitably constitute a tool for fostering
harmony and irenic benevolence among people of divergent positions. But it stands a
chance of enabling residual disputes and conflicts to be based more on genuine
disagreement than on ignorance.
The purpose of this article is twofold. One purpose is to critically engage with
Harrison’s proposed theory of religious diversity, which she calls internalist pluralism.
In brief, this theory contends that apparent disagreements between members of different
religions are not, at least for the most part, genuine disagreements at all; they are instead
mere differences that emerge from distinct conceptual schemes,2 a conceptual scheme
1 See also Harrison (2012, pp. 71–72): ‘In our increasingly multicultural society there is an urgent need for a
theory that is capable of making sense of the various philosophical difficulties presented by ethical and
religious diversity—difficulties that, at first sight, seem to be remarkably similar.’
2 I am borrowing the terminology of a difference versus a disagreement from Harrison, who repeatedly affirms
that her internalist pluralist theory can ‘acknowledge the genuine differences between religious [and/or moral]
traditions’ (2006, p. 300; cf. 2012, p. 86) while regarding these as ‘mere’ differences rather than competing
truth claims (e.g. 2012, p. 79). I take the implication here to be that a ‘mere difference’ does not amount to a
genuine disagreement.
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being the ‘general system of concepts with which we organize our thoughts and
perceptions’ (Blackburn 1994, p. 72, quoted in Harrison 2008, p. 98 fn. 4)3—where
‘our’ may refer either to human beings in general or to some particular community or
group. As will become evident, I am doubtful about the coherence of Harrison’s
proposal, both as a theory and as a means for purportedly advancing interreligious
tolerance or respect. The other main purpose of this article is the constructive one of
demonstrating how the practice of philosophy of religion in general, and of philosophy
of religious diversity in particular, might be improved by means of a more rigorous and
attentive analysis of examples than is commonly displayed in the literature. To this end,
I shall be picking up a number of the examples that Harrison briefly adumbrates and
showing how consideration of alternative interpretive possibilities helps us to avoid
hasty overgeneralising conclusions. When the richness and complexity of human
interactions are attended to, understanding may be enabled to deepen without our being
distracted by certain unhelpful assumptions, such as the assumption that a philosophical
theory is needed to ‘underwrite’ interreligious communication, mutual understanding
and respect.
Harrison’s Internalist Pluralism
Philosophical and theological debates over religious diversity have, since the early
1980s, routinely been framed in terms of a threefold typology of theoretical positions,
namely exclusivism, inclusivism and pluralism. 4 Despite scepticism from several
quarters concerning its viability, the typology has for the most part remained in place.
5 One of the common complaints about the typology is that it tends to oversimplify the
range of theoretical options available. In the case of pluralism in particular, discussions
have generally been fixated on the version of religious pluralism—or ‘the pluralistic
hypothesis’—advocated by John Hick (see esp. Hick 1995, 2004). This fixation has
drawn attention away from the work of other proponents of pluralism, whose respective
theories differ from Hick’s to a greater or lesser extent.6 Among these others is Victoria
Harrison, who has advocated the theory that she terms internalist pluralism in a number
of publications from 2000 onwards.7
Harrison appropriates the term ‘internalism’ from Hilary Putnam, who, in what is
sometimes referred to as his middle period, championed a theory called internal
realism. 8 Notwithstanding Putnam’s own subsequent modifications and partial
3 Following Harrison, I have here quoted from the first edition of Simon Blackburn’s dictionary. In the second
and third editions, there is a shift in the attribution of agency. No longer is it ‘we’ who ‘organize our thoughts
and perceptions’ with the ‘system of concepts’; instead, it is the concepts themselves that ‘shape or organize
our thoughts and perceptions’ (Blackburn 2005, p. 70; 2016, p. 95). Though intriguing, this shift is not
something I have space to pursue here.
4 The typology was first proposed by Race (1983).
5 For discussion of criticisms and a defence of the typology, see Schmidt-Leukel (2005).
6 For a selection of pluralist positions, see Knitter (2005). See also Byrne (1995), Heim (1995) and Griffin
(2005). A concise comparative overview of some of these theories is presented in Ruhmkorff (2013).
7 See esp. Harrison (2000, 2006, 2008, 2012).
8 For talk of Putnam’s ‘middle period’, see for example Norris (2002, esp. chs 3 and 4) and Cormier (2015, pp.
803–805). Putnam later came to refer to this internal realism as ‘pragmatic realism’ (1987, p. 17) and as
‘realism with a small Br^’ (1992a, pp. 26–29).
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disavowals of internal realism (see, e.g. Putnam 1994a, pp. 242–254; 1994b), Harrison
treats it as a live theoretical option. Although internal realism is itself a metaphysical
theory, Putnam defines it in opposition to what he calls ‘metaphysical realism’, the
latter comprising the following three theses: first, that ‘the world consists of some fixed
totality of mind-independent objects’; second, that ‘[t]here is exactly one true and
complete description of Bthe way the world is^’; and third, that ‘[t]ruth involves some
sort of correspondence relation between words or thought-signs and external things and
sets of things’ (Putnam 1981, p. 49). The perspective of metaphysical realism can,
Putnam proposes, be designated as ‘the externalist perspective, because its favorite
point of view is a God’s Eye point of view’ (p. 49). This is to be contrasted with ‘the
internalist perspective’, according to which the question ‘what objects does the world
consist of?’ makes sense only ‘within a theory of description’ (p. 49, Putnam’s
emphasis).
Interchangeably with the term ‘theory of description’, Putnam also uses the term
‘conceptual scheme’. He remarks, for example, that on the internalist view, ‘a sign that
is actually employed in a particular way by a particular community of users can
correspond to particular objects within the conceptual scheme of those users’ (p. 52,
Putnam’s emphasis)—but not outside it. Indeed, on this view, it makes no sense to
suppose that objects could exist as objects independently of any conceptual scheme, for
it is the conceptual scheme (or ‘theory of description’ or ‘scheme of description’) that
divides up the world into distinguishable objects. While some commentators would
construe this as a form of nonrealism or antirealism, Putnam calls it internal realism
because it maintains that the objects we, as individuals, perceive and think about do
really exist independently of our own thoughts and perceptions, albeit not indepen-
dently of the conceptual scheme within which our perceiving and thinking are
occurring.
Taking up Putnam’s internal realism, Harrison applies it to religions. In one article,
she also applies it to systems of ethical values (Harrison 2012), though it is primarily on
what she says about religions that I shall be focusing. Central to Harrison’s appropri-
ation of Putnam’s theory is her contention that if ‘there is no way of intelligibly
discussing what exists in a manner that is conceptual-scheme neutral’, then ‘the
existence of purported religious realities can only be meaningfully discussed within a
particular conceptual scheme or, what we might call, a Bfaith-stance^’ (Harrison 2006,
p. 292). 9 The use of the term ‘faith-stance’ enables Harrison to avoid committing
herself to the view that religions themselves constitute distinct conceptual schemes. She
prefers instead to regard religions as being ‘composed of overlapping conceptual
schemes’ (2012, p. 76), and the term ‘faith-stance’ allows this measure of flexibility.
10 From the claim that intelligible talk of religious realities is always internal to a
9 Harrison initially adopted the term ‘faith-stance’ in the context of discussing Hans Urs von Balthasar’s
theology in her doctoral dissertation (1997). See also Harrison (1998, p. 86).
10 Arguably, Harrison thus evades the force of Terry Godlove’s argument against the coherence of claiming
that religions can be ‘wholly incompatible’ (Godlove 1984, p. 302; 1989, pp. 117–118). Godlove’s argument,
which draws heavily on Davidson (1974), is a general one against even the logical possibility of such
incompatibility. In brief, my own view on this particular point is that, first, it remains unclear what would
count as thorough incompatibility, and second, since Godlove denies the very coherence of the idea of such
incompatibility, he has precluded any possibility of an explanation of what it would amount to. But it is not my
intention to enter into further discussion of Godlove’s position here.
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conceptual scheme or faith-stance, it follows that the very concepts of certain religious
realities are untranslatable from one faith-stance to another.11 In other words, different
religious communities, insofar as they assume different faith-stances and hence operate
with different conceptual schemes, will not be able to understand one another’s
religious beliefs. Thus, Harrison contends, this theory gives us a form of religious
pluralism—internalist pluralism—that avoids both eliminativism and reductivism
(2015, p. 267). The theory is non-eliminativist inasmuch as it eschews the denial of
there being any objective reality corresponding to the beliefs and concepts of the
various religions. And it is non-reductive in that it does not assert that the beliefs and
concepts of all religions, or of all faith-stances, correspond to the same objective reality;
rather, the theory allows for a plurality of such realities, albeit that they are ‘objective’
only in the sense that, internal to a given conceptual scheme, their reality is not
dependent on any individual member of the community that operates with that scheme.
There is still, however, a sense in which the reality of anything, including objects of
religious faith and worship, is dependent upon a given conceptual scheme, and on the
face of it, this is likely to strike many religious believers as an unacceptable implication
of the theory. It is likely to appear unacceptable because it seems to suggest that objects
of religious faith are mere conceptual constructs. To deal with this issue, Harrison
introduces a distinction between ‘conceptual-scheme targetability’ and ‘successful
conceptual-scheme targeting’ (2008), which I shall outline below.
If I have understood Harrison correctly, for an object to be conceptual-scheme
targetable is merely for it to be conceptualised within the conceptual scheme in
question. It is its conceptualisation—that is, the fact of there being a concept of that
object—that makes the object a possible target for belief. Thus, for example, the
concept of nirvāṇa has a place within the conceptual schemes of various Buddhist
traditions, thereby making nirvāṇa a possible object—a targetable object—of belief for
people who operate with (or ‘subscribe to’, as Harrison often puts it) one or other of the
Buddhist conceptual schemes. For an object to be successfully targeted within a given
conceptual scheme, meanwhile, is for it to be the case that not only does the conceptual
scheme in question have a concept of that object, but there is in fact—in reality—an
object to which the concept corresponds. To illustrate the point, Harrison adduces a
simplified nonreligious imaginary example. She invites us to envisage ‘a world in
which there are three large plants’ (Harrison 2008, p. 102). Someone employing a
conceptual scheme that possesses the concept of a tree but lacks any distinction
between elm trees and beech trees, ‘would see a world containing three trees, which
he regards as large plants’. By contrast, someone whose conceptual scheme includes a
distinction between elms and beeches ‘would see a world containing, for example, one
elm and two beeches’. Harrison then adds the following remarks:
The question of whether, along with the first person, we subscribe to a conceptual
scheme that just identifies trees or, along with the second person, we subscribe to
a conceptual scheme that identifies elms and beeches is quite distinct from the
11 Harrison is somewhat equivocal on the issue of translatability. Sometimes, she endorses ‘the idea that there
can be no translation of meaning from one conceptual scheme into another’ (2012, p. 82 fn. 33), whereas
elsewhere she implies that anyone who has been sufficiently ‘immerse[d]’ in two or more conceptual schemes
would be capable of translating from one to the other (e.g. Harrison 2006, p. 299). The difficulties of
interpretation that these equivocations generate will be brought out in my discussion.
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question of whether or not there are any large plants. The latter is, in this example,
not simply conceptual-scheme dependent in the way in which the question of
whether there are just trees or whether there are elms and beeches is wholly a
matter of the choice of conceptual scheme. (Harrison 2008, p. 102)
Harrison’s point appears to be that, despite the differences between their respective
conceptual schemes, both of the individuals in the example can be regarded as having
successfully targeted the objects that Harrison describes as three large plants. The
success consists in the fact that the concepts with which each of the individuals is
operating apply to the objects in question and, furthermore, the objects in question—the
three large plants—really are there to be targeted, independently of the concepts being
applied to them from within specific conceptual schemes. So, in other words, each of
the conceptual schemes represented in the example contains concepts that make the
three large plants targetable, and the application of the concepts to the plants, coupled
with the fact that the plants themselves are not conceptual-scheme dependent, results in
both individuals having successfully targeted the objects. 12 There is, however, a
difficulty in making this part of the theory consistent with Harrison’s overall commit-
ment to internalist pluralism. I shall discuss that difficulty in the next section before
turning to a more general issue that I have with the way in which Harrison works with
illustrative examples.
A Difficulty with the Internalist Pluralist Picture
A brief recap: Harrison intends her theory of internalist pluralism to be acceptable to
religious believers. Indeed, she intends it to be a useful intervention in debates over
religious diversity, for she maintains that its acceptance would promote tolerance and
even respect between different religious communities. Harrison is aware, however, that
internalist pluralism is hardly likely to be accepted by religious believers if it is
interpreted as portraying the very existence, or reality, of objects of religious faith
and worship as being a mere artefact of conceptual schemes. The ‘three large plants’
analogy is intended to show how internalist pluralism can avoid that interpretation. But
how is the analogy supposed to relate to a specifically religious, or multireligious,
context? Harrison herself sketches the following example concerning Christian, Mus-
lim and Hindu conceptions of the divine.
The Christian in Harrison’s example believes in a triune God and also in the
existence of angels and human beings. The Muslim, similarly, believes in angels and
human beings, but believes Allāh to be unitarian. The Hindu, too, believes in angels
(or in beings at least comparable to angels) and in humans but believes the ultimate
divine principle to be Brahman, which is ‘projected’ as multiple deities, including the
three divine forms (trimūrti) popularly known as Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Śiva (Harrison
2008, pp. 105–106). According to Harrison, the respective conceptual schemes of
12 The phrase ‘are not conceptual-scheme dependent’ may need qualifying, depending on how one interprets
Harrison’s position. On one interpretation, it would mean ‘are not dependent on any first-order conceptual
scheme but are nevertheless dependent on a second-order Bmeta-conceptual^ scheme’. We shall come to that
issue in the next section.
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these three religious believers are what determine the differences between the three
sets of beliefs, but it is not the case that the conceptual schemes determine whether the
beliefs are true. ‘For if,’Harrison writes, ‘irrespective of which conceptual scheme is
employed and what range of entities that scheme deems targetable, only human
agents are in fact successfully targeted, the substantive religious claims of Muslims,
Christians and Hindus are false’ (2008, p. 106, my emphasis). A difficulty here is that
of understanding what, on an internalist account, it means to speak of something’s
being ‘in fact successfully targeted’ by a certain concept or set of concepts. On the
basis of my best attempt to make sense of Harrison’s ‘three large plants’ example in
the previous section, I interpret Harrison here to be asserting that if, independently of
any conceptual scheme, there are no divine or angelic ‘agents’, then there is no God
or supreme divine principle and neither are there any angelic beings, and hence
regardless of what any religious conceptual scheme deems to be targetable, the
concepts pertaining to anything divine or angelic will miss their target—because
there is no target to be hit.
Harrison might protest that ‘irrespective of which conceptual scheme is employed’ is
not equivalent to ‘independently of any conceptual scheme’. She might propose that it
makes no sense to suppose that a given being or type of being exists or does not exist
independently of all conceptual schemes, for ‘the existence of purported religious
realities can only be meaningfully discussed within [some] conceptual scheme’
(Harrison 2006, p. 292). To spell out what is meant by ‘irrespective’ in this context,
Harrison might then appeal to the notion of a ‘meta-conceptual scheme’, for in some
places this is what she identifies her internal pluralist theory as being (e.g. Harrison
2006, pp. 299–300). This appeal would enable Harrison to say that ‘irrespective of
which conceptual scheme is employed’ should be understood to mean ‘irrespective of
which first-order conceptual scheme is employed’; if the objects or agents in question
exist within, or from the perspective of, a second-order meta-conceptual scheme, such
as internal pluralism, it is precisely this fact that enables us to declare that they exist
‘irrespective of which [first-order] conceptual scheme is employed’. According to this
interpretation of Harrison’s view—which she does not herself state explicitly—it would
be the existence of human agents combined with the non-existence of any divine or
angelic beings within a meta-conceptual scheme that would make it the case that ‘only
human agents are in fact successfully targeted’ by Muslims, Christians and Hindus.
There are, however, two main problems with this attempt to make sense of
Harrison’s position. One problem derives from Harrison’s recommendation that con-
ceptual schemes be regarded as faith-stances. Since a philosophical theory such as
internalist pluralism is not itself a faith-stance, such theories might be deemed to fall
outside of Harrison’s category of conceptual schemes. This problem would be relative-
ly easy to rectify: Harrison could merely revoke her insinuation that ‘faith-stance’ is
equivalent to ‘conceptual scheme’ and instead propose that faith-stances are one type of
conceptual scheme and philosophical theories are another. The second problem is
harder to resolve. It is that the interpretation of Harrison’s position that I offered above
fails to clarify why, for any given class of objects or beings, it should be the fact that
this class is deemed to exist from within a meta-conceptual scheme that determines
whether members of that class are ‘successfully targeted’ by the concepts of the first-
order conceptual schemes that are under examination by someone operating with the
meta-scheme.
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The upshot of my discussion in this section could be expressed in terms of a
dilemma for internalist pluralism. Either (a) the notion of a concept’s failing to
successfully target anything ‘irrespective of which conceptual scheme is employed’
means that, irrespective of all first-order conceptual schemes, there exists no such target
in a given meta-conceptual scheme (such as the theory of internalist pluralism), or (b)
‘irrespective of which conceptual scheme’ means, in this context, simply ‘independent-
ly of any conceptual scheme’. If we opt for ‘(a)’, then we face the problem of its being
unclear why any meta-conceptual scheme should be deemed capable of determining
whether certain things do or do not exist for first-order conceptual schemes. But if we
opt for ‘(b)’, then it looks as though what began as internal realism has collapsed into
the very externalism, or metaphysical realism, that Harrison wanted to abjure. This is
because, according to ‘(b)’, the issue of whether the concepts—including, of course, the
specifically religious concepts—of a religious community (or those who adopt some
particular faith-stance) succeed in ‘targeting’ anything real is dependent on what is ‘in
fact’ the case, where the facts of the matter are supposed to be independent of all
conceptual schemes.
In the light of my discussion above, it is pertinent to observe that, were we to opt for
the second horn of the dilemma that I have identified, we would end up with a picture
that is comparable to the one that John Hick advocates, which Harrison terms ‘tran-
scendental pluralism’ (e.g. Harrison 2006, pp. 295–301; 2013, pp. 484–487). She calls
it transcendental because it postulates a noumenal ‘Real’ that transcends human
conceptual capacities. By Hick’s lights, this transcendent or ‘transcategorial Real’
eludes description by any conceptual scheme and yet is that towards which every
religion’s (or every ‘great’ religion’s) conception of a divine or other supreme principle
is directed (Hick 2004, esp. pp. xvii–xlii, pp. 231–296). Although Harrison’s talk of
‘agents’ is at a lower level of abstraction than Hick’s talk of ‘the Real’, what option
‘(b)’ would give us is a view that amounts to one closely resemblant of Hick’s realism.
In other words, it gives us the view that what makes it possible to deny that conceptions
of the divine—such as the Trinity, Allāh, Brahman, et al.—must be purely conceptual
constructs is the fact that their truth or falsity is determined by their targeting, or failing
to target, something that is not itself dependent on the conceptual scheme to which they
belong. This, as I have contended, appears to be the picture we are offered when
Harrison is defending internalist pluralism against the charge that it allows the existence
of objects of religious faith and worship to be determined solely by the conceptual
schemes themselves. However, when Harrison is presenting examples to illustrate how
internalist pluralism enables apparent religious disagreements to be reconstrued as mere
religious differences, we get a very different picture. As will become clear in the next
section, I consider Harrison’s way of working with examples to be unsatisfactory both
for substantiating her particular position and as an argumentative strategy more gener-
ally. In this respect, however, she is far from alone in contemporary philosophy.
Working with Examples
There is a tendency within analytic philosophy in general, from which analytic
philosophy of religion is far from immune, to illustrate arguments with examples that
are thinly sketched and poorly contextualised. Discerning readers of such arguments, if
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they can make any sense of the examples at all, could be excused for wondering what
purpose the examples are intended to serve and whether, in the absence of thicker
description, they really serve any useful purpose whatsoever. Unfortunately, the exam-
ples adduced in Harrison’s arguments on behalf of internalist pluralism, though osten-
sibly intended to show how the theory facilitates the dissolution of interreligious
disputes, are of the thin and under-contextualised variety. Examining the weaknesses
of a selection of them will, I propose, provide a useful starting point for reflecting on an
alternative approach to philosophy of religion: an approach that invokes and dwells
with examples long enough to learn what they have to teach us, as opposed to treating
them as mere decoration for a line of argument that owes little if anything to the
examples’ particularities. This largely critically focused article is not the place to flesh
out that alternative approach in full, but I have begun to do so elsewhere.13
Among the relatively few examples that Harrison deploys to illustrate apparent
interreligious disagreements are the following two. First is the case of Śaivite Hinduism
vis-à-vis Roman Catholicism. Within the Śaivite conceptual scheme, Śiva ‘is a real,
objectively existing God’, whereas in the Catholic scheme, God is the Trinity compris-
ing Father, Son and Holy Spirit. Observing that internalist pluralism allows us to
acknowledge these differences, Harrison adds that what the theory does not allow us
to do is to ‘intelligibly discuss the qualities of, for example, Śiva from within a
conceptual scheme, such as a Christian one, in which Śiva occupies no place’ (2006,
p. 293).14 What this is supposed to illustrate is that, from the perspective of internalist
pluralism, the Catholic is in no position to oppugn the god of Śaivism and neither is the
Śaivite in a position to oppugn the god of Roman Catholic Christianity. The
conceptual-scheme dependence of these respective conceptions of God is considered
by Harrison to facilitate a sense in which both might be true—that is, true within the
relevant conceptual scheme—and to thereby delegitimise any denunciation of one or
the other as false.
The second of Harrison’s examples is that ‘of a Christian asserting that Jesus is the
Son of God, and a Muslim replying: BNo, he isn’t!^’ Despite appearances, the two may
in fact not be in disagreement, ‘but merely talking past each other’ (2006, p. 293; 2012,
p. 80). Harrison notes that the situation might be compared to that in which one logician
describes three atoms as a set of three objects while another logician describes the same
atoms as a set of seven objects. Although the logicians appear to be disagreeing, what is
really the case is that the second logician’s conceptual scheme allows pairs and trios
(and other mereological sums) as well as single atoms to count as objects in their own
right, whereas the first logician’s conceptual scheme counts only single atoms as
objects.15
Harrison’s treatments of both the Śaivite and Catholic case and the Christian and
Muslim case raise more questions than they address. Why, for example, should we
suppose that it would be unintelligible to discuss the qualities of Śiva from within a
non-Śaivite conceptual scheme? If I, or Harrison herself, were to be teaching a class on
Hindu representations of the divine, then among the topics we would be discussing are
13 See, for example, Burley (2017a, b, 2018).
14 Virtually the same example occurs in Harrison (2012, p. 79). I have, incidentally, amended the transliter-
ation of the name Śiva.
15 Harrison borrows the three-atoms example from Putnam (1987, pp. 18, 32–35; 1992b, p. 120).
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the qualities that are typically attributed to Śiva by Śaivite Hindus. The fact that an
academic course within a secular educational institution is operating with a conceptual
scheme other than that of religious Śaivism need not vitiate all attempts at discussing
Śiva’s qualities within that context. Harrison concedes that ‘genuinely entering into’
another’s belief system or conceptual scheme would open up the possibility of intel-
ligible interreligious dialogue, and hence also of interreligious dispute, about issues
such as the objectivity and truth of their respective claims (2006, p. 293 fn. 28). But
Harrison admits that the notion of ‘entering into’ is vague. There are many ways in
which one might learn about the concepts of another religion, including concepts
relating to the religion’s deity or supreme principle; and there are many degrees of
learning. Clearly, it would be surprising if a Roman Catholic were to speak of Śiva with
the air of reverence that a Śaivite might, but given a little training in Hindu theology,
there would be nothing to stop the Catholic from conversing intelligibly about Śiva’s
qualities. So the force of Harrison’s initial claim about the impossibility of discussing
those qualities from ‘within’, say, a Christian conceptual scheme becomes hazy. If all it
means is that one could not intelligibly discuss something without having at least some
understanding of that thing, the claim is at risk of seeming banal.
With regard to the Christian who affirms the divinity of Christ and the Muslim who
denies this, on what grounds are we to say whether they are disagreeing with each
other? Since, on the face of it, they do appear to be disagreeing, the onus is on those
who deny that this is what is going on to show how it could be the case that the
apparent disagreement is merely a difference. Harrison’s analogy with the two logicians
does not get us very far, for a difference in criteria for determining how many objects
are constituted by three physical atoms is radically different from a context in which
two people are disputing whether a certain human being is God incarnate. To even
begin to get clear about what the latter dispute amounts to, we would have to gain some
understanding of what it means for a Christian—and perhaps what it means for the
particular Christian involved in the dispute—to believe in the divinity of Christ. For
many Christians, this belief will be deeply embroiled with the attitude of veneration that
goes along with regarding Christ as one’s lord and saviour. To see what this means, one
would have to look to the lives of those who proclaim it. It may turn out to mean many
things, depending on who the proclaimer is. Perhaps this need for looking to the life is
part of what Harrison is getting at by speaking of distinct conceptual schemes. The
belief in Christ’s divinity is enmeshed in a rich conceptual network: what Wittgenstein
in one place refers to as ‘a system of reference’ or ‘system of coordinates’ (1980, p.
64e; 1998, p. 73e). ‘Hence’, Wittgenstein continues, ‘although it’s belief, it is really a
way of living, or a way of judging life. Passionately taking up this interpretation’ (1998,
p. 73e). In short, one might say, the conceptual scheme is inseparable from the form of
life that is being lived.
Pertinent to this issue is Wittgenstein’s distinction between agreement in opinions
and agreement in form of life (Wittgenstein 2009, §241). Deep religious disagreements
are among the most obvious cases in which a disagreement in form of life is paramount.
They are disagreements that could not, even in principle, be resolved by appeal to facts
or evidence that both parties would readily accept. In his ‘Lectures on Religious
Belief’, Wittgenstein gives the example of someone who believes in the Last Judge-
ment and someone else who expresses doubt about it by saying ‘Well, I’m not so sure.
Possibly.’ In such a case, Wittgenstein proposes, ‘an enormous gulf’ would exist
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between the speakers, whereas in a case where two people disagreed merely over the
nationality of an aeroplane that was flying overhead, the conceptual distance between
them would be relatively meagre (Wittgenstein 1966, p. 53). Wittgenstein’s point may
be understood in terms of the distinction between agreement (or disagreement) in
opinions and agreement (or disagreement) in form of life. The disagreement over the
nationality of the aeroplane is a matter of opinion, and it is not hard to imagine what
evidence might be gathered in order to resolve the issue. The disagreement over the
Last Judgement, however, is a disagreement in form of life: persuading one party or the
other to change his or her view would require far more than merely a gathering of
evidence of a sort that would, ab initio, be acceptable to both parties. Rather, what
would be required is something as thoroughgoing as a religious conversion: coming to
see the sense in a form of life that had previously been opaque to one.
So if we think of what Harrison means by different conceptual schemes in terms of
what, in Wittgenstein’s vocabulary, we might call different forms of life, there is
certainly a sense in which the disagreement between a Christian and a Muslim over
the divinity of Christ is apt to be thought of as such a difference. But to assert that it is
therefore not really a disagreement at all is to go too far. The Muslim may have a deep
understanding of what it means to regard Jesus Christ as God incarnate and to live one’s
life in accordance with that commitment. It may be precisely that commitment that the
Muslim is rejecting. The disagreement may thus be one about how to live one’s life. If
that were the case, then it would certainly be a disagreement that goes deeper than a
difference of opinion over an everyday matter of fact, but it would be a disagreement
nonetheless. It is hard to see why Harrison thinks that merely by identifying it as a
difference arising from divergent conceptual schemes, we somehow ease the path
towards mutual toleration and respect. Toleration and respect may well be present,
but not because the disagreement in form of life has been dissolved. It hasn’t.
To take further these considerations about how to work with examples, let us now
turn to another of the examples adduced by Harrison, which in this instance she
borrows from D. Z. Phillips.
Conceptual Schemes, Incomprehensibility and Respect
It is central to Harrison’s argument that ‘the meanings of statements differ according to
which conceptual scheme they are employed within’ and that ‘statements made within
one conceptual scheme can thus be incomprehensible to those within another concep-
tual scheme’ (2012, p. 82). Worth noting immediately is Harrison’s use of the word
‘can’ here. That statements can be incomprehensible to someone operating with a
different conceptual scheme implies that they are not necessarily incomprehensible. So
mutual understanding across conceptual schemes is not being ruled out. But to illustrate
the point that incomprehension does sometimes occur, Harrison borrows a passage
from Phillips that is worth quoting in full:
If I hear that one of my neighbours has killed another neighbour’s child, given
that he is sane, my condemnation is immediate. (There are exceptions. See
Faulkner’s Requiem for a Nun.) But if I hear that some remote tribe practises
child sacrifice, what then? I do not know what sacrifice means for the tribe in
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question. What would it mean to say that I condemned it when the ‘it’ refers to
something I know nothing about? If I did condemn it I would be condemning
murder. But murder is not child sacrifice. ‘The ethical expression of Abraham’s
action is that he wished to murder Isaac: the religious expression is that he wished
to sacrifice him.’ (Phillips 1970, p. 237)16
Though the example is poignant, it is not immediately obvious how it relates to
Harrison’s point about the incomprehensibility of statements. In order to bring out
the relevance, we might imagine that within the society where human sacrifice is
practised, someone states or makes an inscription to the effect that the sacrifice of
children is required in order to propitiate the gods. It is not far-fetched to suppose that
declarations of this kind have been made in some societies, such as those of the Aztecs
and Mayans of pre-Conquest Mesoamerica for example.17 One might then, following
Phillips and Harrison, wonder whether, from one’s present position in a contemporary
western social context, one could readily understand this statement. If one cannot
understand it, then one might, as Phillips does, feel at a loss to know how to form a
moral evaluation of the sacrificial practices at issue.
It is important to recognise that it is by no means self-evident that an intimate
understanding is impossible to achieve in this case. Achieving it may require time and
effort. Sustained study of the historical and anthropological literature may be needed to
acquaint oneself with the forms of life of the people who carried out the sacrifices and
of those, including children, who were sacrificed. Also useful might be reflection upon
the ritualistic dimensions of one’s own life and of the lives of people in cultures with
which one is already familiar—paying particular attention to the ‘deep and sinister’
aspects of certain ritual practices, as Wittgenstein does in some of his ‘Remarks on
Frazer’s Golden Bough’ (1993, esp. p. 147). As noted in the previous section above,
Harrison allows for this kind of intercultural and interreligious understanding across
conceptual schemes: ‘internalist pluralism’, she acknowledges, ‘is not committed to the
claim that one must become an adherent of a particular religious belief system before
one can understand it’ (2006, p. 293 fn. 28). So, again, the ‘can’ in the assertion that
‘statements made within one conceptual scheme can … be incomprehensible to those
within another conceptual scheme’ should certainly not be read as a ‘must’.
Nor should we assume that the process of learning about and familiarising oneself
with a particular society or culture would lead inevitably to a specific moral judgement.
After coming to an enhanced understanding of what it means within the culture (or
conceptual scheme or faith-stance) of the Mayan priesthood to hold child sacrifice to be
necessary for propitiating the gods, some may feel that condemnation is inappropriate,
whereas others may feel even more compelled than they did before to denounce the
practices as morally repugnant. A response of this latter kind might be fortified by the
knowledge that the people who were sacrificed were very far from being willing
16 Most of this passage is quoted in Harrison (2012, p. 82 fn. 33), though Harrison omits the final sentence,
which is itself a quotation from Kierkegaard (1939, p. 34). The very next clause of Kierkegaard’s sentence,
which is quoted neither by Harrison nor by Phillips, reads: ‘and it is precisely here, in the contradiction of the
two expressions of his desire, that lies dread, which may well rob one of one’s sleep.’
17 On Mayan sacrificial practices, see Siegel (1941, p. 65): ‘Human sacrifice played a significant role among
the Bendless rites and ceremonies^ required to supplicate and propitiate the gods. Besides sacrifice by tearing
out the heart, men and girls were flung into pools of water to Bpropitiate the rain gods.^’
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victims, having normally, in the Mayan and Aztec cases for example, been taken
captive during warfare (Sharer 1994, pp. 543–546; Purdum and Paredes 1989, p.
143). In cases where adults who were sacrificed appear to have volunteered, having
regarded a sacrificial death as an honour and privilege, a different set of moral
responses may be elicited.18 My point here is not to suggest that the moral judgements
ought to go one way rather than the other, for the picture in almost any culture we care
to examine is liable to be complicated. But the essential point here is that there is no
reason to assume that differences in form of life—differences between conceptual
schemes—invariably constitute an insuperable barrier to mutual understanding.
The purpose behind each of the examples of Harrison’s that I have discussed,
including the one borrowed from Phillips, appears to be to support the contention that
where a high degree of incomprehension obtains, condemnation of or hostility towards
the uncomprehended statement or practice is out of place. In the case of the Śaivite and
the Roman Catholic, they must, on Harrison’s account, refrain from trying to discuss
each other’s god unless they are somehow able to enter into the other’s conceptual
scheme. Whatever they do, however, they should respect each other. In the case of the
Christian and the Muslim who appear to disagree about Christ’s divinity, they should, it
seems, accept that they do not really understand what the other is saying. If they were to
gain more insight into each other’s conceptual scheme, they would see that their
apparent disagreement is really nothing more than a difference. Again, regardless of
whether they see this, they should respect each other. And in the case of Phillips’
reluctance to make any moral judgement about child sacrifice in a distant culture, it
appears that on Harrison’s interpretation this reluctance is the appropriate response. It
shows that Phillips has recognised the holistic nature of linguistic and perhaps other
forms of expression: without knowing a good deal about the surrounding cultural and
conceptual context, one cannot be sure what the act, which one hazards to call ‘child
sacrifice’, means for the people involved.
What remains unclear is how the attitudes of toleration and respect are supposed to
follow from the appreciation of the diversity of conceptual schemes that Harrison
wishes to encourage. One way of reading Harrison’s argument would be as advocating
the view that incomprehension of another’s conceptual scheme is, or ought to be,
sufficient in itself to motivate a respectful attitude towards the other’s religious beliefs
and practices. That, however, would be a surprising claim to make. Indeed, one might
presume that incomprehension precludes respect as much as it precludes rebuke. Is
Phillips, for example, displaying respect or even tolerance when he says that he would
not know what to say about child sacrifice performed in a distant society? He is
certainly refraining from condemnation, but so too is he refraining from approval or
condonance. None of these attitudes would be apropos in the absence of any clear
understanding of what is going on in the other society—of what the behaviour amounts
to and of what it means for the participants. Only once one has learnt a good deal more
about the society under consideration—and thereby, at least to some extent, entered into
or gained a familiarity with their conceptual scheme or schemes—will one be in a
18 The topic of voluntary human sacrifice is controversial. For claims about voluntary sacrifice among the
Aztecs, see Prescott (1873, p. 87) and Bakk (1989, p. 49). For perspectives on other cultural contexts, see Wu
(1983, p. 44), Law (1985, p. 59) and Willerslev (2009).
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position to express either toleration and respect on the one hand or reprobation on the
other. That, I think, is the only plausible way of interpreting the point that Harrison is
making. To interpret it that way, however, does not give us the conclusion that
internalist pluralism necessarily or inevitably promotes ‘equal respect’ (Harrison
2012, p. 84). It gives us merely the conclusion—perhaps the obvious conclusion—that
developing some degree of understanding of another’s point of view, and of the
conceptual system through which that point of view is articulated, is a necessary
condition for either respecting or not respecting the view in question.
Concluding Remarks
Harrison’s interventions in the debate over religious pluralism in the philosophy of
religion are to be welcomed, not least for the salutary reminder that they give us that
John Hick’s ‘pluralistic hypothesis’ or (to use Harrison’s term) ‘transcendental plural-
ism’ is not the only pluralist position on offer. The emphasis that Harrison’s internalist
pluralism places upon the need for a more holistic conception of meaning than is often
assumed in such debates is also a move in the right direction: to understand what is
being said or done in any mode of life, whether religious or nonreligious, attention to
the wider surroundings is of course essential. But there remain problems with the
theory of internalist pluralism. Crucial among these is the need for clarification about
what the distinction between ‘conceptual-scheme targetability’ and ‘successful
conceptual-scheme targeting’ really amounts to. My discussion of this distinction
resulted in the posing of a dilemma that Harrison’s account seems to face. On the
one hand, if what it means for someone operating with a first-order conceptual scheme
to fail to successfully target a purported object is that the person in question has tried to
apply some concept for which there is no relevant target in a given meta-conceptual
scheme, it remains unclear why the meta-conceptual scheme’s set of concepts should
determine the success or otherwise of the application of concepts in the first-order
scheme. On the other hand, if what failure to target a purported object amounts to is
trying to apply a concept for which there is no appropriate conceptual-scheme-
independent object, then it is difficult to see how the idea of successfully or unsuc-
cessfully targeting an object from within a conceptual scheme can avoid collapsing into
a version of metaphysical realism; that is, it is difficult to see how it can avoid affirming
that there are objects or realities that, without themselves being ontologically dependent
on any conceptual scheme, constitute the targets for concepts or statements issued from
within conceptual schemes. This seems to be strongly implied by Harrison’s talk of the
truth or falsity of ‘the substantive religious claims’ of religious believers being deter-
mined by those claims’ successfully targeting, or failing to target, something that is not
itself constituted by any of the religious conceptual schemes at issue (Harrison 2008,
pp. 106–107), and yet Harrison’s avowed rejection of metaphysical realism pulls in the
other direction.
More generally, I have questioned the way in which Harrison uses examples to
illustrate her argument for the enhanced toleration and respect between religions that
she supposes internalist pluralism to promote. It is, unfortunately, analytic philosophy’s
original sin to treat examples as little more than fodder to embellish and support an
argument that owes nothing to the examples themselves. A consequence is that the
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examples are left thinly sketched, poorly contextualised and hastily interpreted, and the
inferences ostensibly drawn from them are tenuous and ill-supported. The examples
that Harrison offers certainly do not support her strong contention that a Christian’s
affirmation and a Muslim’s denial of the divinity of Christ amounts to a mere difference
rather than to a genuine disagreement. To say what is going on in a case such as this, we
would need to attend to the particularities. I have suggested that Wittgenstein’s
distinction between disagreements in opinions and disagreements in form of life might
provide a useful analytic tool. But even if, in a given case, we were to decide that a
disagreement between a Christian and a Muslim is most aptly characterised in terms of
a disagreement between forms of life, it remains a disagreement nevertheless. It is
unclear how an internalist pluralist analysis is expected to transform the disagreement
into a mere difference.
On the whole, the concept of conceptual schemes is not disastrous, but it can be
highly misleading, especially if we are tempted to describe ‘each conceptual scheme as,
in effect, a self-contained world’ (Harrison 2012, p. 85). Such descriptions compound
the impression that conceptual schemes, and hence the communities who operate with
or ‘subscribe to’ them, are sealed off from one another. Such a picture encourages the
sort of claim that Harrison initially makes with regard to Śiva—that the qualities of this
god cannot intelligibly be discussed in a non-Śaivite conceptual scheme, such as a
Christian one. Upon closer inspection, we see that Harrison allows for the possibility of
entering into another’s conceptual scheme or belief system: of acquainting oneself with
the network of concepts, beliefs and practices that give a conception of God the sense
that it has. What is at issue is thus something more like a melange of overlapping and
interpenetrating schemes, constantly shifting and evolving, with fluid and indeterminate
boundaries—not a constellation of self-contained worlds. If the conceptual schemes or
faith-stances of religious and cultural communities were well described as self-
contained worlds, it is hard to see how anything even approximating the kind of mutual
toleration and respect that Harrison aspires to advance would be possible.
In the end, it remains to be shown why any philosophical theory is needed in
response to religious diversity. If the aim is to increase mutual understanding, commu-
nication and respect, this may well be assisted by closer attention to the specificities of
religious and nonreligious ways of thinking and forms of life, and philosophy has much
to offer through cultivating such modes of attention and analysis. Careful scrutiny of
examples of disagreement or misunderstanding constitutes a helpful starting point. But
the clarificatory work of philosophy is not ultimately in the service of bolstering or
facilitating interreligious harmony: if conflicts and antagonisms exist, philosophy can
serve to elucidate those conflicts and antagonisms—to allow, as D. Z. Phillips has put
it, the ‘disputes, and the ways of settling them, along with failures to settle them, to be
themselves’ (2007, p. 205). But since that task does not involve the construction of a
theory, whether externalist, internalist or anything else, the assumption that religious
believers require a philosophical theory to help them resolve their differences is one
that itself awaits justification.19
19 In revising this article for publication, I have benefited from the comments, both critical and constructive, of
four anonymous reviewers for the journal. I am grateful both to them and to the editors for enabling me to
improve the piece.
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